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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal involves a putative class action brought by 
consumers in four states who alleged that Appellees Owens 
Corning and Owens Corning Sales, LLC (collectively, Owens 
Corning) sold defective roof shingles and misrepresented the 
shingles’ expected useful life. Appellants challenge an order 
of the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania denying class certification. We will affirm.  
I 
 In 2009, Appellants Patricia Wright and Kevin West 
filed suit in the District Court under Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a proposed nationwide 
class of individuals who “owned, own, or acquired” structures 
on which certain Owens Corning-manufactured roofing 
shingles “are or have been installed since 1986.” Gonzalez v. 
Owens Corning, 317 F.R.D. 443, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2016). 
Wright and West claimed that Oakridge shingles—an Owens 
Corning brand of fiberglass asphalt roofing shingles—are 
“plagued by design flaws that result in cracking, curling and 
degranulation” and “will eventually fail, causing property 
damage, and costing consumers substantial removal and 
replacement costs.” Id. at 455. The District Court entered 
summary judgment in favor of Owens Corning, finding that 
Wright and West’s claims had been discharged in bankruptcy 
by the 2006 confirmation of Owens Corning’s reorganization 
plan. We partially reversed, concluding that the claims were 
not discharged. See Wright v. Owens Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 
108–09 (3d Cir. 2012). After the case was remanded to the 
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District Court, Appellants Jaime Gonzalez, Gerald Boehm, 
and Edward and Diane Maag (together with Wright and West, 
Plaintiffs) filed three similar suits in district courts in other 
states, which were then transferred to the Western District of 
Pennsylvania and consolidated with Wright and West’s case.  
Plaintiffs are homeowners from Pennsylvania, Illinois, 
Texas, and California, on whose roofs Oakridge shingles 
were installed prior to 2006. They allege that their shingles 
have not performed as promised because they were 
manufactured “in accordance with defective design 
specifications.” Gonzalez, 317 F.R.D. at 450. Of the named 
plaintiffs, three reported property damage and two had their 
roofs reshingled. The shingles were all subject to warranties 
of 25 years or more, which Plaintiffs argue amounted to 
affirmative representations about the shingles’ expected 
useful life. Plaintiffs proposed two classes in the District 
Court: (1) a class of property owners from their four home 
states (the Four-State Class), asserting various combinations 
of state-law causes of action against Owens Corning; and (2) 
a nationwide class of property owners (the Nationwide Class) 
seeking a ruling regarding the legal standard governing 
whether Owens Corning can use a bankruptcy discharge 
defense to shield itself from liability.  
A 
Plaintiffs proffer the Four-State Class as either a 
money damages class under Rule 23(b)(3) or an issue class 
under Rule 23(c)(4). Plaintiffs define the class as follows: “all 
individuals and entities that own a building or structure 
physically located in the states of California, Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, or Texas on which Owens Corning’s Oakridge-
brand shingles were installed from 1992 through 2012, and 
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where those shingles manifested any cracking, degranulation, 
fragmentation, or deterioration during the warranty coverage 
period.” 317 F.R.D. at 453. 
During the proposed 20-year class period, Owens 
Corning manufactured at least 23 kinds of Oakridge shingles 
at 13 different plants around the country using more than 500 
design specifications. Plaintiffs did not dispute that all of 
these specifications met the applicable industry standard 
(ASTM D3462), which prescribes minimum measurements 
for newly manufactured shingles, such as “tear strength, net 
mass, mat mass, asphalt mass, and mineral matter mass.” Id. 
at 465. Plaintiffs contended that in lieu of industry standards, 
defectiveness should be judged by the expected useful life of 
the shingles as represented by the applicable warranty period. 
According to Plaintiffs, compliance with ASTM D3462 did 
not consistently yield shingles that would last until the 
applicable warranty expired. In Plaintiffs’ view, Owens 
Corning’s design specifications sometimes yielded shingles 
vulnerable to “premature deterioration so that they . . . will 
actually only last 15 to 20 years.” App. 247–48.  
Plaintiffs claimed that Oakridge shingles had a 
propensity to fail before their warranties expired because of 
one or more of the following design flaws: insufficient 
asphalt quantity or quality, and insufficient mat mass and tear 
strength. Based on testing he conducted on 298 shingles, 
Plaintiffs’ expert Dean Rutila opined that “about half” of the 
Oakridge shingles produced during the proposed 20-year 
class period fell on the “low end” of Owens Corning’s 
specifications, which meant they were manufactured at or 
near the ASTM minimums. Id. at 514, 523, 528. Owens 
Corning challenged the admissibility of Rutila’s opinions 
under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 
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U.S. 579 (1993). The District Court ruled that all testimony 
based on Rutila’s testing was inadmissible, but that he could 
testify to the general effect of various measurements on 
shingle performance based on his review of Owens Corning’s 
internal documents, including design specifications and 
internal communications. For example, Rutila could testify 
that Oakridge design specifications produced shingles with a 
significant range of measurements, with only the “high-end” 
shingles capable of lasting for more than 20 years. Gonzalez, 
317 F.R.D. at 499. Rutila acknowledged, however, that the 
“appropriateness of design specification measurements can 
only be judged in relationship to each other,” id. at 485, and 
that “a shingle would have to be individually inspected to 
determine whether it is a nondefective or defective shingle,” 
id. at 514. As a result, Plaintiffs could not point to “any 
particular measurement or set of measurements for the 
individual elements of a shingle that constitute a design 
defect.” Id.  
B 
Plaintiffs propose that the Nationwide Class proceed 
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) or Rule 23(b)(2), and that it include 
“all individuals and entities that own a building or structure 
physically located in the United States on which Owens 
Corning’s Oakridge-brand shingles are currently installed, 
where those shingles were purchased on or before September 
26, 2006.” Id. at 453. Through the Nationwide Class, 
Plaintiffs seek to mitigate what they perceive is a risk of 
inconsistent judgments resulting from the procedural history 
of this case prior to the consolidation of Wright and West’s 
action with those brought by the other named plaintiffs.  
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On September 26, 2006 (the cutoff date for the 
proposed class), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Delaware confirmed a reorganization plan for 
Owens Corning after nearly six years of bankruptcy 
proceedings. Pursuant to the order confirming the plan and 11 
U.S.C. § 1141, all claims that existed against Owens Corning 
as of that date were discharged. After Wright and West 
brought suit but before Plaintiffs’ actions were consolidated, 
Owens Corning moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
the claims belonging to Wright and West existed prior to 
September 26, 2006, and were thus discharged when the 
reorganization plan was confirmed. The District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Owens Corning, citing 
this Court’s decision in JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re 
Grossman’s Inc.), 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(“Grossman’s”). In that case, we held that for purposes of 
determining whether a claim is dischargeable in bankruptcy, 
the claim arises when the claimant is exposed to the debtor’s 
product or conduct, regardless of when an injury is 
discovered. Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 125. For Wright and 
West, this meant that their claim arose when they purchased 
their shingles. Since that was before Owens Corning’s 
reorganization plan was confirmed, the District Court 
concluded that Wright and West’s claims were discharged.  
On appeal to this Court, we declined to apply the 
Grossman’s rule retroactively, citing due process concerns. 
See Wright, 679 F.3d at 108–09 (3d Cir. 2012). We concluded 
that bankruptcy cases in which reorganization plans were 
confirmed prior to the Grossman’s decision are governed by 
the dischargeability standard articulated in the case that 
Grossman’s overruled, namely Avellino & Bienes v. M. 
Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 
9 
 
1984). Wright, 679 F.3d at 109. Since Owens Corning’s 
reorganization plan was confirmed prior to our decision in 
Grossman’s, we held that Frenville governed whether Wright 
and West’s claims were discharged. Id. Under the Frenville 
standard, a court must look to the underlying state limitations 
law to determine when a claim arises. Id. at 104 & n.5. Thus, 
for example, a claim brought under the law of a state in which 
the discovery rule applies arises when the claimant discovers 
the injury. We affirmed in part and reversed in part the 
District Court’s summary judgment, agreeing with the Court 
that Wright and West held “claims” under the Bankruptcy 
Code, id. at 106–07, but concluding that the Court erred in 
holding that those claims had been discharged, id. at 109.  
On remand to the District Court, this case was 
consolidated with the cases brought in other districts by 
Gonzalez, Boehm, and the Maags. Because no class had been 
certified at the time of our decision in Wright, that decision 
did not bind unnamed putative class members. Hence 
Plaintiffs’ desire to certify the Nationwide Class, through 
which they seek a judgment declaring that Frenville governs 
the dischargeability of class members’ claims—effectively 
giving our decision in Wright binding classwide effect. 
Owens Corning concedes that, as we made clear in Wright, 
Frenville (not Grossman’s) applies in determining whether 
the claims against it have been discharged in bankruptcy, and 
it has repeatedly—including during oral argument—
foresworn any intention of raising a discharge defense against 
Plaintiffs or future claimants. Plaintiffs nevertheless argue 
that classwide adjudication of the question we faced in Wright 
is necessary “[t]o avoid inconsistency and needless litigation 
for other consumers.” Plaintiffs Br. 22. 
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C 
 Plaintiffs moved for certification of the Four-State and 
Nationwide Classes. On March 31, 2016, the District Court 
denied Plaintiffs’ motion. With respect to the Four-State 
Class, the District Court concluded that Plaintiffs had not met 
their burden under Rule 23(b)(3) to show that “questions of 
law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members,” Gonzalez, 317 
F.R.D. at 510, nor was it persuaded that certifying a class 
under Rule 23(c)(4) to decide issues of liability was 
appropriate.1 The District Court concluded that the 
Nationwide Class could not satisfy the commonality 
requirement of Rule 23(a) because the only common question 
it presented was not justiciable. Plaintiffs filed a timely 
petition for Rule 23(f) review, which we granted.  
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d). We have appellate jurisdiction over this 
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Rule 
23(f). 
“We review a class certification order for abuse of 
discretion, which occurs if the district court’s decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Hayes v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 354 (3d Cir. 2013) 
                                                 
1 Plaintiffs also moved for certification of the Four-
State Class under Rule 23(b)(2), which the District Court 
denied. Plaintiffs have not appealed that ruling. 
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(internal quotation marks omitted). We review de novo 
whether an incorrect legal standard has been used. Id. 
III 
In this appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the District Court 
denied certification of the Nationwide Class based on an 
erroneous understanding of the requirements for justiciability 
under Article III of the Constitution, and that its denial of 
certification of the Four-State Class was, among other errors, 
improperly grounded in its assessment of the merits, as 
forbidden by the Supreme Court in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut 
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013). 
Every putative class action must satisfy the four 
requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
613 (1997). In addition to the Rule 23(a) requirements, a class 
action must satisfy Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3). The party 
seeking certification bears the burden of establishing each 
element of Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence. See 
In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 
(3d Cir. 2009). Echoing the Supreme Court, we have 
repeatedly “emphasize[d] that ‘[a]ctual, not presumed 
conformance’ with Rule 23 requirements is essential.” Id. at 
326 (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167 (3d Cir. 2001)). A class action 
“may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a 
rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have 
been satisfied.” Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 
147, 161 (1982). To proceed under Rule 23(b)(3), Plaintiffs’ 
proposed Four-State Class must meet the additional 
requirements that “[common] questions of law or fact . . . 
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predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members” and that “a class action is superior to other 
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  
We agree with the District Court that the Nationwide 
Class cannot satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement 
because the only common question it poses can be answered 
only by way of an advisory opinion, which is forbidden by 
Article III. As we shall explain, because we agree with the 
District Court that the Four-State Class cannot satisfy 
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement, we need not 
discuss the other requirements of Rule 23 as they relate to the 
Four-State Class. Finally, the District Court’s conclusion that 
a Rule 23(c)(4) issue class is not an appropriate vehicle for 
the Four-State Class was not an abuse of discretion.  
A 
Plaintiffs first argue that the District Court erred when 
it failed to certify the Nationwide Class under Rule 23. Rule 
23(a) requires that the named plaintiffs share with the rest of 
the putative class at least one “question[] of law or fact.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2); see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 
U.S. 338, 359 (2011) (“[F]or purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) [e]ven 
a single [common] question will do.” (second and third 
alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
And that common question must be justiciable under Article 
III of the Constitution. See Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., 
LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 366 (3d Cir. 2015). In this appeal, 
Plaintiffs must establish the justiciability of the following 
question: what legal standard governs the dischargeability of 
claims against Owens Corning? Failing that, the Nationwide 
Class cannot satisfy the commonality requirement and 
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certification is inappropriate under either Rule 23(b)(1)(B) or 
(b)(2). Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613. We therefore examine the 
requirements of Article III to determine whether the District 
Court abused its discretion.  
“Article III . . . restricts the power of federal courts to 
‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 
171 (2013). Accordingly, federal courts may not give 
“opinion[s] advising what the law would be upon a 
hypothetical state of facts.” Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 
U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). In determining whether an actual controversy exists, 
we have considered “the adversity of the interest of the 
parties, the conclusiveness of the judicial judgment and the 
practical help, or utility, of that judgment.” Step-Saver Data 
Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 1990). 
Step-Saver was a suit for declaratory relief in which the 
plaintiff corporation sought a declaration that its suppliers 
were responsible for any liability it may have had to its 
customers as a result of the customers’ pending suits against 
it. Id. at 646. While Plaintiffs do not invoke the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02, they acknowledge that 
their position is analogous to that of one seeking a declaratory 
judgment. The Step-Saver factors are therefore appropriate 
guides to our analysis. See, e.g., Coffin v. Malvern Fed. Sav. 
Bank, 90 F.3d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying Step-Saver 
factors to justiciability analysis where relief sought was 
“somewhat analogous to . . . a declaration of rights”).  
Despite Owens Corning’s assurances that it will not 
raise a discharge defense, Plaintiffs maintain that the interests 
of the parties are sufficiently adverse to give rise to a 
justiciable case or controversy. They argue, contrary to the 
District Court’s analysis, that Owens Corning would not be 
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precluded from raising a discharge defense. Because of the 
discretionary nature of collateral estoppel when asserted by a 
plaintiff who was not party to the original judgment—what 
we call “non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel”—a court 
could theoretically decline to find that Wright precludes a 
discharge defense under these circumstances. So long as such 
a possibility exists, Plaintiffs argue, the parties’ dispute 
remains a live one and their interests are adverse.  
Plaintiffs’ analysis does not change the fact that the 
relief they seek would come from an advisory opinion. Put in 
terms of the Step-Saver factors, the judgment Plaintiffs seek 
on behalf of the Nationwide Class would lack both 
conclusiveness and practical utility. See Step-Saver, 912 F.2d 
at 647. As Plaintiffs acknowledge, because the Frenville test 
requires a fact-intensive analysis of each claim under the 
applicable state limitations law, a court’s declaration that 
“Frenville applies” would not determine whether the claims 
held by individual members of the Nationwide Class were 
discharged. That would depend on the outcome of the 
Frenville analysis as applied to each claim. But Plaintiffs do 
not seek this relief. Instead, they ask that we now declare—as 
we did in Wright—that Frenville applies, but this time in the 
class context. Plaintiffs do so as a preemptive strike in the 
event Owens Corning might raise a discharge defense in 
future litigation.  
This is the opposite of a conclusive judgment. It is 
more akin to the bankruptcy court order we reviewed in 
Coffin, which stated that a debtor’s bankruptcy confirmation 
had not discharged a bank’s mortgage lien. 90 F.3d at 852–
53. We concluded that the order constituted an advisory 
opinion, since it decided “no actual controversy between the 
parties.” Id. at 853. The determination of whether the bank’s 
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lien had been discharged was “not before the court for 
adjudication,” because the debtor had not moved for an order 
of lien avoidance, and the bank had not yet attempted to 
enforce its lien. Id. That determination would have to be 
“made by another court in foreclosure proceedings[,] and the 
bankruptcy court’s advice will have no legal effect.” Id. at 
854. Here, if Owens Corning were to raise a discharge 
defense against a future claimant, the court hearing that case 
would be required to decide what law governs. That 
contingency is not before us. 2 
Nor are we persuaded that the judgment Plaintiffs seek 
on behalf of the Nationwide Class would be of any utility to 
them beyond what we held in Wright. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ 
                                                 
2 Plaintiffs’ and amici’s citation to In re Nassau 
County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006), is 
inapposite. There, plaintiffs challenged a county jail’s strip 
search policy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants 
conceded the policy’s unconstitutionality, which the district 
court found “removed all common liability issues,” since the 
only remaining issues concerned whether individual class 
members’ rights were violated. In re Nassau County, 461 
F.3d at 224. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that rather 
than defeating predominance under Rule 23(b)(3), the 
concession acted as a form of classwide proof. Id. at 228–29. 
But justiciability under Article III, not predominance under 
Rule 23(b)(3), is at issue here. Because the Nassau County 
plaintiffs still had § 1983 claims pending before the district 
court, an “actual controversy between the parties” remained. 
Coffin, 90 F.3d at 853. By contrast, Plaintiffs requested that 
the District Court here preempt a potential defense in a future 
case. 
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suggestion, such a judgment would not adjudicate the rights 
of the parties, since it would not decide whether, under 
Frenville, a particular class member’s claims had been 
discharged. It would merely repeat, on a larger scale, what 
this Court has already held. We understand Plaintiffs’ concern 
that Wright’s preclusive effect might be left to the discretion 
of a distant tribunal in a hypothetical future case, but 
Plaintiffs do not cite, and we cannot find, any support for the 
proposition that this fact alone suffices to create a justiciable 
question.3 
For these reasons, we conclude that the sole common 
question the Nationwide Class asked the District Court to 
                                                 
3 Plaintiffs correctly note that, as we explained in 
Gayle v. Warden Monmouth County Correctional Institution, 
“courts should exercise great caution before denying class 
certification” on the basis that it is unnecessary. 838 F.3d 297, 
310 (3d Cir. 2016). But contrary to their suggestion, our 
conclusion that certification is inappropriate here is consistent 
with Gayle. In that case, we reversed a denial of class 
certification predicated on the conclusion that it would serve 
“[n]o useful purpose” after the district court’s merits rulings. 
Id. at 303. We held that “necessity is not a freestanding 
requirement justifying the denial of class certification,” and 
that district courts can consider it only to the extent it bears 
on the ability of a putative class to satisfy the requirements of 
Rule 23. Id. at 310. Here, the District Court did not treat the 
usefulness of the relief sought by Plaintiffs as a freestanding 
requirement, but rather as a component of its justiciability 
analysis. As we have explained, that analysis was necessary 
to determine if Plaintiffs could satisfy the commonality 
requirement of Rule 23.   
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answer was not justiciable under Article III. The District 
Court rightly concluded that Plaintiffs could not satisfy the 
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) and therefore did not 
err when it denied Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the Nationwide 
Class.4 
B 
We turn next to the District Court’s decision regarding 
the Four-State Class. The predominance requirement of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) “tests whether 
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 
adjudication by representation.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 
552 F.3d at 310–11 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623). 
Predominance requires “[i]ssues common to the class [to] 
predominate over individual issues[,]” In re Prudential Ins. 
Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 313–14 (3d Cir. 
1998), a “far more demanding” standard than the 
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a), Amchem, 521 U.S. at 
623–24. To assess whether predominance is met at the class 
certification stage, a district court must determine whether the 
essential elements of the claims brought by a putative class 
are “capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common 
                                                 
4 Plaintiffs complain that despite their request at oral 
argument for certification under Rule 23(b)(2) as an 
alternative to certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the District 
Court’s opinion does not address the appropriateness of Rule 
23(b)(2) as a vehicle for the Nationwide Class. The need for 
such an analysis, however, was obviated by the District 
Court’s conclusion that the Nationwide Class failed to satisfy 
the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a), which applies to 
class actions under both Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2).  
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to the class rather than individual to its members.” In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311–12. This determination 
requires a “rigorous assessment of the available evidence and 
the method or methods by which plaintiffs propose to use the 
evidence to prove” these elements. Id. at 312. “If proof of the 
essential elements of the cause of action requires individual 
treatment, then class certification is unsuitable.” Newton, 259 
F.3d at 172. Accordingly, we examine the essential elements 
of Plaintiffs’ claims on behalf of the Four-State Class, as well 
as the evidence they propose to use, “through the prism” of 
the predominance requirement to determine whether the 
District Court properly denied class certification. Marcus v. 
BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 600 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citation omitted). 
Plaintiffs proffer numerous claims, but each can be 
categorized as one of the following: breach of express 
warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, 
violation of state consumer protection statutes, and unjust 
enrichment. In the District Court, Plaintiffs pointed to two 
questions central to all claims that, on their view, 
predominated over individual issues: whether Oakridge 
shingles suffer from a common defect, and if so, whether 
Owens Corning misrepresented the shingles’ expected useful 
life. As the District Court observed, the defect question is 
primary, because success on each claim requires a finding 
that Oakridge shingles are defectively designed. This is 
because “[t]he only misrepresentations or omissions that 
Owens Corning is accused of making are that Oakridge-brand 
shingles will last for at least 25 years, or for the same number 
of years as the limited shingle warranty.” Gonzalez, 317 
F.R.D. at 512. Owens Corning argued that “[i]f a class 
member’s Oakridge shingle was not defective, no warranty 
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was breached. . . . Similarly, if [the] . . . shingles were not 
defective, then Owens Corning’s conduct was not . . . 
actionable under the state consumer fraud acts; nor has 
Owens Corning unjustly retained any benefit.” App. 2824. 
Defective design is therefore an essential element of 
Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation-based claims, and whether it is 
susceptible to classwide evidence is dispositive of whether 
Plaintiffs can satisfy predominance. 
While the parties agreed that the defect question 
underpins this case, they disagreed about the implications of 
this fact for the predominance analysis. Plaintiffs argued that 
the defect question was common and predominant for 
purposes of Rule 23(b)(3). Owens Corning countered that 
while the question may be essential to this litigation, it could 
not be “proven using classwide evidence,” and thus neither 
could Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims. App. 2824. During 
the proposed class period, Owens Corning noted, 23 types of 
Oakridge shingles were designed according to 500 different 
specifications. As Plaintiffs acknowledged, the useful life of a 
shingle could be estimated only upon inspection of that 
shingle. Finally, Owens Corning argued that Plaintiffs’ 
admission that a significant proportion of Oakridge shingles 
may in fact last the length of their warranties, i.e., lack any 
defect, distinguishes this case from the defective-products 
cases Plaintiffs cited in which courts certified a class after 
finding a predominant common question.  
In response, Plaintiffs argued that their theory of 
defective design did not require them to show that all 
Oakridge shingles were prone to fail during their warranty 
periods. According to Plaintiffs, all Oakridge shingles could 
be considered defectively designed, regardless of their actual 
measurements or performance, because Owens Corning’s 
20 
 
design specifications provided for a range of measurements 
that resulted in some shingles having a higher-than-advertised 
likelihood of failing before the warranties expired. It therefore 
did not matter that Plaintiffs’ expert could not identify the 
particular measurements that supposedly rendered the 
Oakridge specifications defective. Regardless of the quality 
of the shingles on their own roofs, all Oakridge customers had 
unknowingly entered a “shingle lottery,” Gonzalez, 317 
F.R.D. at 478–79. Because this theory of defect applies to the 
entire class, Plaintiffs argued, a predominant common 
question existed and Rule 23(b)(3) was satisfied.  
The District Court rejected this argument and agreed 
with Owens Corning that it would be “impossible for 
plaintiffs to meet their burden to prove a design defect by 
evidence common to the class.” Id. at 512. Because the 
presence of a design defect was an essential element of 
Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation-based claims, the District Court 
concluded that they could not be proved by common 
evidence. Given that, as Plaintiffs acknowledged, the design 
defect and misrepresentation issues form the core of their 
theory of liability, the Court concluded that the inability to 
prove these issues through classwide evidence was fatal to 
predominance and thus to certification of the Four-State 
Class. 
Plaintiffs’ theory of design defect—which absolves 
them of the need to identify any particular problems with 
their shingles—is the focus of Plaintiffs’ appeal. According to 
Plaintiffs, the District Court’s rejection of this theory was an 
abuse of discretion because the District Court: (1) misread 
product-defect cases in this circuit and others; (2) improperly 
excluded expert testimony; and (3) contravened Amgen by 
assessing the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims at the class 
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certification stage. In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue that the 
District Court should have certified a “liability-only class” 
under Rule 23(c)(4) because that “resolution of the common 
liability issues would materially advance the litigation.” 
Plaintiffs Br. 21. We will address these arguments in turn. 
1 
 Plaintiffs argue that, because customers were “playing 
roulette in assuming that Oakridge shingles will last for the 
full warranty period,” Plaintiffs Br. 15, they “did not get the 
benefit of the[ir] bargain,” regardless of their shingles’ actual 
performance. Plaintiffs Br. 40. Consequently, they liken their 
case to a number of product-defect cases in which courts have 
certified a class despite an alleged defect not manifesting 
itself in each product. For example, they cite Sixth and 
Seventh Circuit cases involving Whirlpool washing machines 
that tended to accumulate mold because of an alleged design 
defect. In each case, class certification was upheld despite the 
absence of mold accumulation in the majority of class 
members’ washing machines. See In re Whirlpool Corp. 
Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838 (6th 
Cir. 2013); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702 F.3d 359 (7th 
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 569 U.S. 1015 
(2013), judgment reinstated on remand, 727 F.3d 796 (7th 
Cir. 2013).  
The cases involving Whirlpool washing machines are 
not on point because there is a critical distinction between a 
latent defect and a non-existent one. The defect in the 
washing machine cases was allegedly present in all washing 
machines manufactured under a particular line, even if the 
defect had not yet manifested itself. See In re Whirlpool 
Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d at 
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847. Plaintiffs in those cases had adduced evidence at the 
class certification stage indicating that the allegedly defective 
washing machines had all been built according to nearly 
identical designs. See id. (explaining that the various types of 
front-loading washing machines at issue shared “nearly 
identical engineering”); see also Butler, 702 F.3d at 361 
(noting “all Kenmore-brand frontloading ‘high efficiency’ 
washing machines” were alleged to suffer from the same 
defect). This meant that the lack of a mold problem in some 
machines was the result of latency, not the absence of a 
defect.  
By contrast, Plaintiffs here do not identify a particular 
defect that can be attributed to all Oakridge shingles. They 
instead admit that a great many Oakridge shingles will last 
through the end of their warranty periods, and that a shingle-
by-shingle inspection is necessary to distinguish ones that are 
likely to fail before the end of their warranty periods from 
ones that are likely to perform as expected (i.e., that are not 
defective). This case is thus unlike those in which the latency 
of an alleged defect did not pose an obstacle to certification.  
For the same reasons, Plaintiffs’ citations to Rikos v. 
Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2015); Wolin 
v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 
2010); Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(per curiam); and Daffin v. Ford Motor Co., 458 F.3d 549 
(6th Cir. 2006) are not persuasive. In each case, the plaintiffs 
were able to identify a particular defect that, whether it had 
manifested itself, allegedly existed in each of the relevant 
products. See Rikos, 799 F.3d at 519 (noting the allegation 
that nutritional supplement is “snake oil” and yields no 
benefit to any class members); Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1172 
(noting that a geometric defect in vehicle alignment was 
23 
 
alleged to be present in each class member’s car); Pella, 606 
F.3d at 392 (noting that all ProLine casement windows were 
allegedly designed to allow water to seep behind aluminum 
casing, accelerating wood rot); Daffin, 458 F.3d at 551 
(observing that allegedly defectively designed throttle body in 
named plaintiff’s vehicle was identical to that found in all 
vehicles covered by the class definition). Not only do 
Plaintiffs fail to identify an alleged defect common to all 
Oakridge shingles, they fail to specify where within a range 
of measurements a particular design “crosses the line from 
producing nondefective products to producing defective 
products or to quantify how often defective products, versus 
nondefective products, were produced.” Gonzalez, 317 F.R.D. 
at 513.  
As we noted, Plaintiffs attempt to circumvent the need 
to identify a common defect by, in effect, redefining the 
concept to include a subset of defective shingles. 
Unsurprisingly, they cite no case sanctioning such a 
remarkable proposition. Plaintiffs’ citation to In re IKO 
Shingle Products Liability Litigation, 757 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 
2014), a roofing shingle case in which not all shingles were 
manifestly defective, is unavailing. In that case, the Multi-
District Litigation Court’s order denying class certification 
was vacated because it had incorrectly imposed a 
commonality-of-damages requirement at the class 
certification stage. IKO, 757 F.3d at 603. The plaintiffs in that 
case—unlike Plaintiffs here—had no difficulty articulating a 
defect common to all of their shingles, namely, their failure to 
meet the manufacturer’s promise that they satisfied the 
applicable ASTM standard. Id. at 599.  
Equally unavailing is Plaintiffs’ analogy to McManus 
v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 320 F.3d 545 (5th Cir. 2003), 
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in which certification of a class was upheld on the ground that 
class members “did not receive the benefit of their bargain.” 
Id. at 552 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The 
plaintiffs in that case were nevertheless required to explain 
why the motor homes they had purchased were defective, and 
their explanation applied to all class members: none of the 
motor homes could “safely tow a normal car without 
supplemental breaks.” Id. at 551–52. As in all of the other 
cases Plaintiffs cite, members of the putative class in 
McManus were required to articulate a defect allegedly 
present in all relevant products. Regardless of the theory of 
liability pursued, Rule 23 requires, if nothing else, that a 
putative class must describe the product’s defect on a 
classwide basis. If proponents of the class do not allege a 
defect common to the class, the defectiveness of a given 
product is, by necessity, not susceptible to proof by classwide 
evidence.  
Finally, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016), is misplaced as well. In 
that case, a class of employees claimed Tyson Foods violated 
the Fair Labor Standards Act when it failed to compensate 
them for time spent “donning and doffing” protective gear. 
136 S. Ct. at 1042. Because Tyson had failed to keep records 
for the relevant period, the class proposed to use a study 
measuring uncompensated overtime using a representative 
sample of employees. Id. at 1043. The Supreme Court held 
that the class could extrapolate from the results of the study to 
establish classwide liability, even though the parties agreed 
that some class members were properly compensated, 
because the study was “the only practicable means to collect 
and present relevant data.” Id. at 1046. Tyson objected that 
uninjured class members might share in or increase the 
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amount of the awarded damages, but the Court concluded that 
this was an issue the parties could address upon 
apportionment of the damages. Id. at 1049–50. Despite the 
necessary inquiries into individual work times, the Court held 
that the question of whether the time employees spent 
“donning and doffing” the gear was compensable work under 
the FLSA satisfied the predominance requirement. Id. at 
1045–46. This appeal is unlike Tyson. The FLSA question in 
Tyson was a common one because its resolution would 
determine the scope of all class members’ rights and leave 
only questions of individual damages. Here, by contrast, 
resolving the defect issue can be done only by examining 
each individual shingle or by accepting a speculative theory 
of defect.  
In this case, instead of alleging a defect common to the 
class that might be proved by classwide evidence, Plaintiffs 
invite us to equate the existence of a defect with the mere 
possibility that one might exist. We find no support in 
Rule 23 or caselaw for class certification on such a 
speculative basis. Far from abusing its discretion, the District 
Court properly concluded that Plaintiffs’ novel reformulation 
of the concept of a product defect could not be permitted to 
work an end run around the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).  
2 
Plaintiffs argue that the District Court also abused its 
discretion by ruling inadmissible the testimony proffered by 
Rutila based on his testing of Oakridge shingles. The Court 
ruled that Rutila could not testify because, among other 
reasons, the results were tainted by selection bias and 
statistically insignificant in light of the millions of Oakridge 
shingles installed during the class period. As Rutila admitted, 
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the 298 shingles he tested had been returned in connection 
with a warranty claim, so they were the antithesis of a random 
sample of Oakridge shingles.  
Plaintiffs make several arguments as to why the 
Court’s ruling on Rutila’s testimony was erroneous, but we 
need not address them, because our Rule 23 analysis is 
unaffected by the outcome.  Even if all of the testimony 
offered by Rutila were admissible, Plaintiffs would not have 
been able to cure their inability to identify a meaningful 
defect in Oakridge shingles susceptible to classwide evidence. 
As the District Court noted, Rutila’s testing did not enable 
him to identify when a shingle “crosses the line and becomes 
defective.” Gonzalez, 317 F.R.D. at 479. Nor would it have 
negated Rutila’s own admissions that (1) one can identify a 
shingle as defective, however that term is defined, only after 
examining it individually, and (2) even shingles designed at 
the low end of Owens Corning’s specifications will not 
necessarily fail before the end of their warranty periods. The 
fundamental problem thus remains: Plaintiffs cannot identify 
what is defective about their shingles, let alone how the 
unidentified defect is susceptible to proof common to all class 
members.5 It is therefore unnecessary for us to undertake a 
                                                 
5 Although the class definition’s limitation to shingles 
that “manifested any cracking, degranulation, fragmentation, 
or deterioration during the warranty coverage period,” 
Gonzalez, 317 F.R.D. at 453, might seem to solve this 
problem, it is irrelevant to the predominance inquiry. The 
definition limits who may be a member of the class, but it 
does not purport to define the elements of the claims brought 
on its behalf. Only the latter are relevant to the predominance 
inquiry.  
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Daubert analysis to determine whether the District Court 
abused its discretion in holding Rutila’s testimony 
inadmissible.6  
                                                 
6 After it excluded Rutila’s testing, the District Court 
ruled that Rutila would be permitted to testify that mat mass 
of approximately 1.5 pounds per 100 square feet would 
ensure a non-defective shingle. The Court would not permit 
him to testify, however, as to what measurements of asphalt 
mass and net weight would ensure a non-defective shingle. 
Even if all of these opinions were admissible, however, they 
would not help Plaintiffs articulate a meaningful theory of 
defect susceptible to classwide evidence, for two reasons. 
First, an opinion that one measurement will guarantee 
adequate performance does not mean that anything less is 
defective. Second, as discussed at the Daubert hearing, “it is 
the relationship between mat mass, asphalt mass and net 
weight that must be coordinated in order to produce a shingle 
that will be reliable.” App. 390. Thus, a shingle with an 
inadequate mat mass might not fail before the end of the 
applicable warranty period if its other measurements are 
sufficient. The fact that this relationship can only be assessed 
upon inspection of a particular shingle only compounds the 
evidentiary problem for Plaintiffs. At any rate, Plaintiffs only 
challenge the District Court’s exclusion of testimony based 
on Rutila’s testing of returned shingles.  
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3 
Plaintiffs argue that, to the extent the District Court 
had reservations about their theory of defect, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Amgen required it to set them aside for 
purposes of the class certification decision: “[t]he district 
court may not have liked this theory, but class certification 
was not the place to adjudicate it.” Plaintiffs Br. 41.  
In Amgen, the Supreme Court cautioned district courts 
not to “put[] the cart before the horse” by allowing their 
views of the merits to affect their analysis of the independent 
question whether a putative class satisfies the requirements of 
Rule 23. 568 U.S. at 460. “[T]he office of a Rule 23(b)(3) 
certification ruling is not to adjudicate the case; rather, it is to 
select the method best suited to adjudication of the 
controversy fairly and efficiently.” Id. (alteration and internal 
quotation marks omitted). While in some cases it may be 
inevitable that the class-certification analysis “entail some 
overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim,” 
id. at 465–66 (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351), as a general 
matter, “Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-
ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.” Id. at 466. 
 Plaintiffs call the District Court’s opinion the 
“antithesis of Amgen.” Plaintiffs Br. 36. According to 
Plaintiffs, the merits of their theory of defect were irrelevant 
to class certification, and thus off limits under Amgen. But the 
District Court’s analysis, they correctly note, is laced with 
merits determinations. For example, the Court characterized 
Plaintiffs’ theory of defect as “seemingly novel and illogical,” 
Gonzalez, 317 F.R.D. at 513, and concluded that Plaintiffs 
had “submit[ted] no legal authority to support their 
proposition that a design specification that sets a range of 
29 
 
measurements, some of which will produce defective 
products and some of which will not, can establish a design 
defect claim,” id. at 495. Plaintiffs argue that these merits 
determinations “infected the entire certification process,” 
requiring a remand. Plaintiffs Br. 2.  
Because “all of the claims in the lawsuit will rise or 
fall on the question of defect,” and at least some of the 
evidence they propose to use—including portions of Rutila’s 
testimony and internal Owens Corning communications—is 
applicable to all class members, Plaintiffs claim they have 
satisfied their burden under Amgen by identifying a “common 
question[] that will yield [a] common answer[].” Reply 
Br. 10. (emphasis omitted). To be sure, if defect is defined in 
the manner Plaintiffs propose, it does not require a leap to 
conclude that the alleged defect is susceptible to classwide 
evidence, since class members would not be required to show 
anything about their individual shingles. But Plaintiffs offer 
no support for the idea that it is a violation of Amgen to 
recognize at the certification stage that the “question of 
defect” they propose is only superficially a “common 
question,” just as any question becomes universal when it 
includes the word “all.” Nothing about Amgen or Rule 23 
limits district courts in this way. As the Amgen Court 
recognized, merits determinations are permitted “to the 
extent . . . relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 
prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” 568 U.S. at 
466. As with the other requirements of Rule 23, the 
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is “not [a] mere 
pleading rule[.]” In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 316. 
To determine whether the requirement is met, a court may 
“delve beyond the pleadings” and answer questions that are 
often “enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising 
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the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Newton, 259 F.3d at 167 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Courts “must 
resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to class 
certification, even if they overlap with the merits—including 
disputes touching on elements of the cause of action.” In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307.  
In this context, the District Court was not bound—by 
Amgen or otherwise—to deem sufficient for certification the 
“question of defect” as Plaintiffs presented it. It is 
incongruous to argue simultaneously, as Plaintiffs do, that 
their theory of defect is central to their claims and that its 
coherence and legal foundation are irrelevant to the 
certification decision. By rejecting Plaintiffs’ theory, the 
District Court did not find as a matter of fact that Oakridge 
shingles are not defective. It merely applied Rule 23’s 
predominance requirement, under which Plaintiffs were 
required at the certification stage to identify a defect that 
affected all class members’ shingles, regardless of whether 
the defect will ultimately be proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence at the merits stage. It does not follow from Amgen 
that a common question suffices for purposes of Rule 23 by 
virtue of Plaintiffs’ ipse dixit. Instead, it remains the task of 
district courts, through application of the rule’s requirements 
to the facts and claims before it, to determine what constitutes 
a “question[] of law or fact common to class members.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The District Court’s determination in this 
regard, while fatal to certification, was nonetheless squarely 
within the discretion afforded it by Amgen and Rule 23. What 
Plaintiffs attack as the District Court’s “obsession with the 
merits,” Plaintiffs Br. 36, we conclude was instead nothing 
more than the “rigorous analysis” required to determine 
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whether the proposed class actually met the requirements of 
Rule 23. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161.7 
Our conclusion that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in rejecting Plaintiffs’ theory of defect for purposes 
of Rule 23 ends our analysis of whether the Four-State Class 
                                                 
7 Plaintiffs quote several other passages in the District 
Court’s opinion in which the Court discusses, or appears to 
discuss, the merits of Plaintiffs’ defect claim, allegedly in 
violation of Amgen. These passages do not show what 
Plaintiffs suggest when read in context. For example, 
Plaintiffs call “especially revealing” the District Court’s 
observation that because it had ruled Rutila’s testing 
inadmissible, “[P]laintiffs were tasked with proving their 
design defect claim by way of [other] evidence,” Gonzalez, 
317 F.R.D. at 478. Plaintiffs Br. 35. The Court was not 
suggesting that Plaintiffs were required to prove the merits of 
their defect claim at the class certification stage, though that 
might be inferred by Plaintiffs’ incomplete quotation, which 
stops after the word “claim.” Rather, the Court was simply, 
and correctly, noting that it was Plaintiffs’ burden under Rule 
23 to show that the defect claim was susceptible to proof by 
classwide evidence despite the inadmissibility of this portion 
of Rutila’s testimony. The other passages Plaintiffs cite turn 
out to be similarly innocuous. To the extent Plaintiffs argue 
that the District Court’s Rule 23 analysis violated Amgen in 
its treatment of their misrepresentation-based claims, we need 
not address this issue, because, as explained, the inadequacy 
of Plaintiffs’ theory of defect for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3) is 
alone fatal to class certification.  
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should have been certified under Rule 23(b)(3).8 As we have 
explained, because Plaintiffs cannot show that liability for 
defective design is susceptible to classwide evidence, they are 
equally unable to show the same in support of their 
misrepresentation claims. They are thus unable to show that 
“[common] questions of law or fact . . . predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members,” as 
Rule 23(b)(3) requires. Our conclusion that predominance is 
lacking makes it unnecessary for us to discuss whether 
Plaintiffs have satisfied the other requirements of Rule 23. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
certification of the Four-State Class under Rule 23(b)(3). 
                                                 
8 Despite its conclusion that Plaintiffs’ “inability to 
prove the existence of a design defect by evidence that is 
predominantly common to the class is fatal to [their] 
misrepresentation-based legal claims,” the District Court 
undertook an analysis of the latter “for the sake of 
completeness.” Gonzalez, 317 F.R.D. at 515. For reasons 
already explained, we agree with this conclusion.  
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4 
 Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that the District Court 
abused its discretion in denying certification of the Four-State 
Class as a liability-only issue class under Rule 23(c)(4), 
which provides that “[w]hen appropriate, an action may be 
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to 
particular issues.” In Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 
255 (3d Cir. 2011), we enumerated several non-exhaustive 
factors relevant to assessing whether certification of an issue 
class under Rule 23(c)(4) is appropriate. Those factors 
include “the efficiencies to be gained by granting partial 
certification in light of realistic procedural alternatives” and 
“the substantive law underlying the claim(s).” Id. at 273.  
Plaintiffs sought to pursue their claims as an issue 
class under Rule 23(c)(4) because the issues involved rest on 
a “common core of facts,” so efficiencies would be gained by 
resolving them in a single proceeding. Gonzalez, 317 F.R.D. 
at 528. The District Court disagreed, in part for the same 
reasons it concluded that Plaintiffs could not satisfy the 
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3): because the 
issues are not susceptible to “proof by common 
evidence[,] . . . [n]o efficiencies are gained by litigating 
[them] on a classwide basis.” Id. 
“[A] court’s decision to exercise its discretion under 
Rule 23(c)(4), like any other certification determination under 
Rule 23, must be supported by rigorous analysis.” Hohider v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 200–01 (3d Cir. 
2009). While Plaintiffs are correct to point out that the 
appropriateness of certifying a Rule 23(c)(4) class is 
analytically independent from the predominance inquiry 
under Rule 23(b)(3), a case may present concerns relevant to 
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both. See Gates, 655 F.3d at 272–74. This is such a case. 
Unlike a situation in which a Rule 23(c)(4) class might be 
appropriate because liability is capable of classwide treatment 
but damages are not, Plaintiffs offer no theories of liability for 
which classwide treatment is apt. The District Court therefore 
correctly determined that a Rule 23(c)(4) class would not 
“materially advance resolution of the underlying claims,” id. 
at 269, any more than would a class under Rule 23(b)(3). 
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the District Court’s 
denial of certification of the Four-State Class under 
Rule 23(c)(4) was an abuse of discretion. 
IV 
 For the reasons stated, the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for class 
certification. We will affirm. 
